When the Registrar Steps Back, the Panel Cannot Step In: Grekul, 2026 ABRECA 24

By: Mark Jacka and Scott Chimuk

On May 6, 2026, an Appeal Panel of the Real Estate Council of Alberta (“RECA”) set aside findings of professional misconduct and the resulting sanctions against Michael Grekul, a residential real estate associate.[1] Blue Rock Law acted for Mr. Grekul before the Hearing Panel and on appeal. The decision addresses two questions of general importance in Alberta administrative law. The first is what a tribunal must have before it to find that a professional standard was breached. The second is what a tribunal may do when the party ordinarily responsible for advancing the case declines to do so.

The Decisions Under Appeal

Mr. Grekul listed a residential property in Edmonton as having a “double attached garage.” He did not measure the garage and relied on observation. The purchaser later measured the interior width at approximately 14 feet, found that two vehicles would not fit, and complained to RECA. The Registrar refused the complaint under s. 38.1 of the Real Estate Act. On the complainant’s appeal, a panel determined under s. 40(2) that there was sufficient evidence of conduct deserving of sanction, and the matter proceeded to a hearing.

At the hearing, the Registrar tendered the investigative evidence but, consistent with RECA’s Hearing and Appeal Practice and Procedure Guidelines, took no position on whether misconduct had been established. The Hearing Panel announced that it would take a more active role and questioned the witnesses accordingly. In decisions dated September 16 and November 8, 2024, it found breaches of Rule 41(b) (competent service), Rule 41(g) (strict accordance with the Act and Rules) and Rule 42(g) (conduct undermining public confidence in the industry). Applying the Kienapple principle, it entered sanctionable findings under Rules 41(b) and 42(g) only. On January 15, 2025, it imposed a $1,500 fine and a letter of reprimand.[2]

Mr. Grekul appealed under s. 48 of the Act. The Appeal Panel heard the appeal on March 2, 2026, allowed it, and set aside both findings and both sanctions.

Finding One: A Professional Standard Must Be Established by Evidence

The Hearing Panel accepted that no written standard requires a licensee to measure a garage. It nonetheless concluded that reasonable verification of garage size was so commonly understood within the profession that the standard could be identified through its licensee members and judicial notice.

The Appeal Panel held that this was an error. It found that the record contained no expert evidence, no written standard and no evidence of generally accepted practice. Relying on Walsh and the Court of Appeal’s endorsement of that reasoning in Kherani v Alberta Dental Association, 2025 ABCA 2, it held that a tribunal must ground the applicable standard of practice in evidence external to the tribunal. A panel cannot establish the standard by reference to its own view of best practice.[3] It added that the classification of this garage was not self-evident, so judicial notice was not available.

Without an evidentiary foundation for the standard, no breach of Rule 41(b) could be found. Because the Rule 42(g) finding rested on the same conduct, it could not be sustained either.[4]

Finding Two: A Neutral Registrar Does Not Enlarge the Panel’s Role

Reviewing the hearing on a standard of correctness, the Appeal Panel held that it was procedurally unfair. Having reviewed the transcript, it identified a pattern of questioning that went beyond clarifying evidence and sought admissions on the central issues. One example was asking the Licensee whether, having been given the measurements, he would still characterize the garage as a double garage. That question, in the Appeal Panel’s words, “brought the Hearing Panel into the fray.”[5]

A panel may question witnesses to understand the evidence. It may not assume an adversarial or prosecutorial role, and that is so whether or not a party is advancing the position it would ordinarily be expected to advance. The Appeal Panel also observed that the Registrar’s neutrality had effectively neutered the complainant’s ability to present an adversarial case, and that the Hearing Panel’s response to that gap contributed to the loss of adjudicative neutrality.[6]

Implications for Other Tribunals

The decision is persuasive rather than binding, but its reasoning is not specific to real estate. A tribunal asked to find incompetence or a breach of an unwritten professional standard should expect to be asked what evidence establishes the standard. The experience of a panel’s professional members may assist in weighing the evidence, but this decision indicates that it cannot replace evidence of the standard itself, and that judicial notice is confined to matters that are genuinely beyond reasonable dispute.

The second finding is a caution for any tribunal facing a gap in the adversarial process. Where the party that would ordinarily carry the case declines to do so, the tribunal remains an adjudicator on the record as presented. It is not entitled to build the case on the central issues.

Limits and Lesson

The Appeal Panel framed its procedural fairness finding as one made “in the circumstances of this case,” so its precedential reach is uncertain. Its comments on the complainant’s position also suggest that the complainant-appeal route under s. 40 sits uneasily with an adversarial model when the Registrar takes no position, although the Appeal Panel offered no remedy for that difficulty.

The basic lesson is nonetheless clear. The Registrar’s neutrality does not permit a panel to step into the Registrar’s shoes without compromising its own neutrality and the fairness of the proceeding.

[1] Michael Grekul, 2026 ABRECA 24 (CanLII), https://canlii.ca/t/klflt.

[2] Grekul (Re), 2025 ABRECA 1 (CanLII), https://canlii.ca/t/kbfwj.

[3] 2026 ABRECA 24 at paras 36–44, citing Council for Licensed Practical Nurses v Walsh, 2020 NLCA 11 and Kherani v Alberta Dental Association, 2025 ABCA 2.

[4] Ibid at paras 45–51.

[5] Ibid at paras 54–60.

[6] Ibid at paras 61–64.